What are the stylized facts that characterize the dynamics of credit booms and the associated fluctuations in macro-economic aggregates? This paper answers this question by applying a method proposed in our earlier work for measuring and identifying credit booms to data for 61 emerging and industrial countries over the 1960-2010 period. We identify 70 credit boom events, half of them in each group of countries. Event analysis shows a systematic relationship between credit booms and a boom-bust cycle in production and absorption, asset prices, real exchange rates, capital inflows, and external deficits. Credit booms are synchronized internationally and show three striking similarities in industrial and emerging economies: (1) credit booms are similar in duration and magnitude, normalized by the cyclical variability of credit; (2) banking crises, currency crises or Sudden Stops often follow credit booms, and they do so at similar frequencies in industrial and emerging economies; and (3) credit booms often follow surges in capital inflows, TFP gains, and financial reforms, and are far more common with managed than flexible exchange rates.
Introduction
Episodes in which credit to the private sector rises significantly above its long-run trend (i.e. "credit booms") are often associated with periods of economic turbulence.
Until recently, however, efforts at developing methodologies for identifying credit booms and characterizing the economic fluctuations that accompany them often produced mixed results (see, for example, Gourinchas, Valdes, and Landerretche (2001) ). In addition, little was known about the association between economy-wide credit booms and the financial conditions of individual firms and banks, and about whether the characteristics of credit booms differ across industrial and emerging economies. This changed with the growing literature on credit booms developed over the last five years. In particular, in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) we proposed a new methodology for measuring and identifying credit booms and showed that it was successful at identifying credit booms with a clear cyclical pattern in both macro and micro data.
The method we proposed is a "thresholds method." This method works by first splitting real credit per capita in each country into its cyclical and trend components, and then identifying a credit boom as an episode in which credit exceeds its long-run trend by more than a given "boom" threshold, defined in terms of a tail probability event. The duration of the boom is similarly set by "starting" and "ending" thresholds. The key defining feature of this method is that the thresholds are proportional to each country's standard deviation of credit over the business cycle. Hence, credit booms reflect countryspecific "unusually large" cyclical credit expansions.
In this paper, we apply this method to data for 61 countries (21 industrial countries, ICs, and 40 emerging market economies, EMs) over the 1960-2010 period. We found a total of 70 credit booms, 35 in ICs and 35 in EMs, including 16 credit booms that peaked in the critical period surrounding the recent global financial crisis between 2007 and 2010 (again with about half of these recent booms in ICs and EMs each). 1 We then take the peak dates of all credit booms and construct seven-year event windows around them to examine the dynamics of macro aggregates in the upswing and downswing of credit booms. This exercise is similar to the one conducted in our 2008 paper, but the extension of the sample period to include 2007-2010 is a critical addition because it adds key evidence from the credit booms that collapsed with the 2008 global financial crisis.
The results show that credit booms are associated with periods of economic expansion, rising equity and housing prices, real appreciation and widening external deficits in the upswing phase of the booms, followed by the opposite dynamics in the downswing. Moreover, credit booms tend to be synchronized internationally and centered on "big events" like the 1980s debt crisis, the 1992 ERM crisis, the 1990s Sudden Stops, and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. In addition, splitting our sample into financial crisis vs. non-crisis cases, we find that booms in the crisis group were larger.
A major deviation in the evidence reported here relative to our previous findings in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) is that adding the data from the recent credit booms and crises we find that in fact credit booms in ICs and EMs are more similar than different. In contrast, in our earlier work we found differences in the magnitude of credit booms, the size of the macro fluctuations associated with credit booms, and the likelihood that they are followed by banking or currency crises.
Credit booms across EMs and ICs are similar in three key respects: First, although credit booms are larger in EMs (with real credit per capita peaking at about 30 percent above trend in the median of all EM credit booms v. 12 percent for IC credit booms), normalizing by each country's cyclical standard deviation of credit, credit booms are remarkably uniform in size. The normalized peak of credit booms is about 2 standard deviations for EMs and 2.1 for ICs. A similar observation applies to the magnitude of the fluctuations that macro aggregates display during credit booms. These fluctuations are larger in EMs, but since EMs also display higher cyclical standard deviations in these variables, normalized fluctuations associated with credit booms are actually similar in size. 2 The second similarity is that, while not all credit booms end in crisis, the peaks of credit booms are often followed by banking crises, currency crises or Sudden Stops, and the frequency with which this happens is about the same for EMs and ICs (20 to 25 percent for banking and currency crises, 14 percent for Sudden Stops). This is a critical change from our previous findings, because lacking the substantial evidence from all the recent booms and crises, we had found only 9 percent frequency of banking crises after credit booms for EMs and zero for ICs, and 14 percent frequency of currency crises after credit booms for EMs v. 31 percent for ICs. Clearly, the larger sample of credit boom events used here yields a different picture indicating that in the aftermath of credit booms both groups of countries suffer both types of crises, and also Sudden Stop crises, with about the same frequency.
The third similarity relates to the factors that can act as potential triggers of credit booms. In particular, surges in capital inflows, gains in total factor productivity (TFP), policy reforms in the financial system, and managed exchange rates all play a role in both ICs and EMs. There are some differences across the two groups, because the frequency of credit booms in EMs is 47 percent when preceded by periods of large capital inflows (v.
33 percent in ICs) and 30 percent for financial reforms (v. 22 percent for ICs), while TFP gains precede credit booms with a frequency of 42 percent for ICs (v. 20 percent for EMs). But the overall message is that these three factors precede the peak of credit booms with a frequency of roughly 1/5 to 1/2. Moreover, credit booms in both ICs and EMs are far more frequent in the presence of fixed or managed exchange rates (with a frequency of about 2/3 rds for all countries), than under floating or dirty floating regimes (with frequencies ranging from 3 to 20 percent).
Our work is related to the empirical literature that identifies booms in macro variables using threshold methods and event-study techniques. Montiel's (2000) analysis of consumption booms was one of the first studies in this vein. Gourinchas et al. (2001) introduced threshold methods to the analysis of credit booms, followed by several other studies including Cottarelli, et. al. (2003 ), International Monetary Fund (2004 ), Hilberts, et. al. (2005 , and Ottens, et. al. (2005) There are also other studies that examine linkages between credit and macro variables without measuring credit booms (e.g. Collyns and Senhadji (2002) , Borio, et. al. (2001) , and Kraft and Jankov (2005) ).
findings, they find that booms in capital inflows are associated with periods of economic expansion and booming credit and asset prices.
Before our 2008 working paper provided a new methodology to measure credit booms, the standard practice in empirical studies on this topic followed the method proposed by Gourinchas et al (2001) . There are three important differences between their method and ours: (1) we use real credit per capita instead of the credit-output ratio as the measure of credit;
(2) we construct the trend of credit using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter in its standard form, instead of using an "expanding HP trend" (see Mendoza and Terrones (2008) for details); and (3) we use thresholds that depend on each country's cyclical variability of credit, instead of a threshold common to all countries. 4
These differences have important implications. As shown in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) , an example of both methods applied to Chilean data shows that the method of Gourinchas et al. (2001) is not robust to the choice of credit measure, and that it treats each period's credit observation as unduly representative of its trend (because it models the long-run trend of credit as a smoothed, lagged approximation of the actual data).
Moreover, the two methods yield sharply different predictions about the association between macro variables and credit booms. In particular, we find that output, consumption and investment rise significantly above trend during the expansionary phase of credit booms, and fall below trend during the contractionary phase. In contrast, they found weak evidence of cycles in output and absorption associated with credit booms.
We also find a clear association between credit booms and financial crises, while they found that the likelihood of financial crises does not increase significantly when credit booms are present.
Our work is also related to the analysis of the credit transmission channel in twin banking-currency crises by Tornell and Westermann (2005) . 5 These authors document that twin crises are preceded by rising credit-GDP ratios, increases in output of nontradables relative to tradables, and real appreciations, followed by declines in all of these variables. In addition, they used the World Bank's World Business Economic Survey (WBES) to document asymmetries in the access to credit markets of firms in the tradables v. non-tradables sectors. We also look at sectoral differences in the evolution of output dynamics, but our approach differs in that we examine these dynamics conditional on credit boom episodes, rather than conditional on being on a twin-crises event.
Our frequency analysis of the association of credit booms with capital inflows, financial reforms, and TFP gains is related to theoretical and empirical studies on the mechanisms that drive credit booms. These include theories in which excessive credit expansion is due to herding behavior by banks (Kindleberger (2000) ); information problems that lead to bank-interdependent lending policies (Rajan (1994) and Gorton and He (2005) ), the underestimation of risks (Boz and Mendoza (2011) and Borio, et. al. (2001) ) and the lowering of lending standards (Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006)); the presence of explicit or implicit government guarantees (Corsetti, et. al. (1999) ); or limited commitment on the part of borrowers (Lorenzoni (2005) ). Similarly, our analysis of the connection between credit booms and macroeconomic activity is related to the literature on business cycle models that incorporate "financial accelerators," by which shocks to 5 Tornell and Westermann also study the extent financial market imperfections influences the cycle in the middle income countries during tranquil times. See also Scheneider and Tornell (2004) . asset prices and relative good prices are amplified through balance sheet effects (see, for example, Fisher (1933) , Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , and Mendoza (2005) and (2010)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our method for identifying credit booms, implements it using our cross-country sample, and examines the main characteristics of credit booms in industrial and emerging economies. Section 3 studies the credit-boom dynamics of the cyclical components of macro aggregates.
Section 4 concludes.
Credit Booms: Methodology and Key Features

Methodology
A credit boom is defined in general as an episode in which credit to the private sector grows by more than during a typical business cycle expansion. In Mendoza and Terrones (2008) we formalized this definition as follows. Denote the deviation from the long-run trend in the logarithm of real credit per capita in country i, date t as l it , and the corresponding standard deviation of this cyclical component as ( ) We also conducted sensitivity analysis for  = 1.5 and 2 and confirmed that our main results are robust to the value of . , where  s and  e are the start and end thresholds. 6 We use baseline values  s = e =1, and we also tried other values including 0, ¼, ½ and ¾. 7 Once the starting and ending dates are set, the duration of the credit boom is given by the difference t e -t s .
Credit boom episodes and their main features
We use data on credit from the financial sector to the private non-financial sector obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics for a sample of 61 countries, 21 industrial and 40 emerging economies (see Appendix 1), for the 1960-2010 period.
Our measure of credit is the sum of claims on the private sector by deposit money banks (IFS line 22d) plus, whenever available for the entire sample period for a given country, claims on the private sector by other financial institutions (IFS line 42d). Real credit per capita is calculated as the end-of-year observations of nominal credit per capita deflated by their corresponding end-of-year consumer price index. Data sources for these and all other variables used in the paper are listed in Appendix 2. 6 These threshold conditions are set to minimize the absolute values of differences of l it relative to targets because the data are discrete, and hence in general l it does not match the targets with equality. 7 We use thresholds such that  s = e < , but notice that in principle  s and  e could differ, and one or both could be set equal to .
We identified 70 credit booms in our data, 35 in ICs and 35 in EMs. 8 Figure 1 provides a summary view of these credit booms by plotting the cross-country mean and median of the cyclical components of real credit per capita in seven-year event windows centered at the peak of credit booms for the two groups of countries. These graphs show that credit booms in EMs are larger than in industrial countries in absolute terms: At the peak of the booms, the average expansion in real credit per capita reached about 30 percent above trend in EMs, twice what is observed in ICs. Normalized by the standard deviation of the cyclical component of credit in each country, however, credit booms in the two groups of countries show a similar distribution, with medians of 2 and 2.1 for ICs and EMs respectively (see Figure 2 ). Thus, normalized by the variability of credit, the magnitude of credit booms does not differ significantly across EMs and ICs. Table 1 shows the duration of credit booms for different starting and ending thresholds, and the length of the corresponding upswing and downswing phases. In general, the results based on medians indicate that EMs and ICs show booms with similar duration of about 3-6 years, and the fraction of the boom spent in the upswing and downswing phases with the duration thresholds set at 1 is about the same. Using means, however, EMs seem to show longer and more asymmetric booms.
Credit booms tend to be clustered geographically and not limited to a single region:
40 percent of the booms experienced by emerging economies were observed in East Asia and 32 percent in Latin America. Likewise, 33 percent of the credit booms in industrial countries were observed in the G7 and 18 percent in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden). In addition, Figure 3 shows that credit booms tend to be synchronized internationally and centered around big events-e.g. the Bretton Woods collapse of the early 1970s, the petro dollars boom in the prelude to the 1980s debt crisis, the ERM and Nordic country crises of the early 1990s, the 1990s Sudden Stops, and the recent Global Financial Crisis. It is interesting to note that excluding the recent crisis, the 
Credit Booms and Macroeconomic Dynamics
This Section examines the business cycle behavior of the economy during credit boom events, and conducts a frequency analysis of the association between credit booms and financial crises, and between credit booms and some of their potential determinants.
Event analysis
We construct seven-year event windows of the cyclical components of macro aggregates centered on the peak of credit booms (i.e. t is normalized to date t=0). The windows show the cross-country means and medians of output (Y), private consumption (C), public consumption (G), investment (I), the output of nontradables (YN), the real exchange rate (RER), the current account-output ratio (CAY) and total capital inflows as share of output (KI). All these variables are at constant prices, expressed in per-capita terms and detrended with the HP filter setting the smoothing parameter at 100, except for RER (which is not in per-capita terms) and the current account-output and capital inflows-output ratios (which are at current prices and not expressed in per capita terms). Output, expenditures and the current account in the industrial countries follow a cyclical pattern similar to that observed in the emerging economies, but the amplitude of these fluctuations is smaller (particularly for YN and RER), and government consumption shows a different pattern (just about at trend in the expanding phase and slightly above trend in the contraction phase). However, if we were to normalize the macro data using standard deviations of cyclical components, and take into account that EMs display higher business cycle variability in all their macro-aggregates (see, for example, Mendoza (1995) ), we would see again that credit booms display similar features across EMs and ICs.
Two important caveats apply to the event study graphs of macro dynamics. First, they illustrate the cyclical dynamics of macro variables, but do not show if these variables themselves are undergoing a boom (i.e. an unusually large expansion as defined by our thresholds method). We now study the behavior of inflation, equity prices and housing prices during credit booms (see Figure 8 ). Using medians, there is only a week association between credit booms and inflation in both EMs and ICs, with below-trend inflation in the upswing and above-trend inflation in the downswing. 10 Hence, credit booms are generally not associated with sharp changes in inflation. In contrast, housing and equity prices show a clear pattern of rising prices in the upswing and declining prices in the downswing.
Equity prices rise to 25-30 percent at the peak of credit booms, and housing prices rise to 10-15 percent in both EMs and ICs. The downswing of credit booms leads to significant equity price collapses of about 20 percent in real terms in both groups of countries. These movements in asset prices are important because they are consistent with theoretical explanations of credit booms and busts that rely on financial accelerators and balance sheet effects.
Real M2 money balances also expand during the upswing and contract during the downswing of credit booms (see Figure 7 ). This suggests that monetary policy may play a role in fueling credit booms, inasmuch as real M2 moves along with credit during credit boom episodes. 11 10 The mean inflation in EMs does show a shift from sharply below-trend inflation to sharply above-trend inflation but that reflects outliers driven by a few hyperinflation episodes in Latin America. 11 There is the impression that central banks in developing countries often loosen (tighten) monetary policy in good (bad) times. However, a systemic characterization of this regularity has been elusive because of lack of good indicators of the monetary policy stance (see, for instance, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2005) .
The event windows for industrial and emerging economies mask important variations across country regions. In ICs, the Nordic countries show larger fluctuations in credit and in the macro variables than the G7 (Table 4 , Panel A). In addition, some of the macro variables in the Nordic countries peak earlier than credit. In the case of EMs (Table 4, Panel B), credit expansions and the associated surge in consumption are much larger in Latin America. In contrast, the current account reversals when the credit booms revert are larger in Asia.
In summary, the macro event study shows that credit booms across emerging and industrial economies are associated with a well-defined pattern of economic expansion in the build-up phase of the booms, followed by contraction in the declining phase. Output, expenditures, stock prices, housing prices, and the real exchange rate move above trend in the first phase, and drop below trend in the second phase, and the current account falls first and then rises. All of this happens without major changes in inflation in most countries.
There are interesting differences in the dynamics around credit boom events across EMs and ICs in terms of the amplitude of macro fluctuations in levels (i.e. without some form of normalization) and in the dynamics of government expenditures. These differences are consistent with three well-known facts in international business cycle studies: First, as noted earlier, the larger amplitude of the fluctuations displayed by EMs is in line with well-established evidence showing that business cycles are larger in developing countries (see Mendoza (1995) , Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) , Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). Second, the striking difference in the behavior of government purchases is consistent with the evidence produced in the literature on the procyclicality of fiscal policy in EMs (see Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2005) ). Third, the widening current account deficits followed by reversals, and the larger booms followed by collapses in the price and output of the nontradables sector, are consistent with observations highlighted in the Sudden Stops literature (e.g. Calvo (1998 ), Mendoza (2007 , Caballero and Krishnamurty (2001) ). However, it is important to note that generally these facts have been documented by examining macroeconomic data without conditioning for credit booms. In contrast, our results apply specifically to fluctuations associated with credit boom episodes. This is particularly relevant for the Sudden Stop showing only ambiguous evidence of this association. Figure 6 in their paper shows a small cycle in GDP, a decline in GDP growth below trend for the entire duration of credit booms, and no cycle in consumption.
Frequency analysis
We conduct next a frequency analysis to examine three issues: (1) the association between credit booms and financial crises;
(2) the role of capital inflows, TFP gains, financial reforms and exchange rate regimes as preconditions of credit booms; and (3) the probability of experiencing a credit boom once the starting threshold is crossed.
Credit booms are often cited as the culprit behind financial crises, particularly in emerging economies (see Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002) . If this is the case, credit booms should be closely associated with financial crises. Table 5 shows the percent of banking crises, currency crises and Sudden Stops that occurred during the seven-year window of the credit boom events in EMs, ICs and all countries combined. The percent of crises that occurred before, at, and after the peak of the credit booms are listed in separate columns.
The dates identifying the occurrence of these crises were obtained from sources in the empirical literature (Demirguic-Kunt and Detragiache (2006) for banking crises, Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) for currency crises, and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) for Sudden Stops). It is also worth noting that, within the seven-year window of credit boom events, the incidence of the three types of crises is at its highest after credit booms peak, and this holds again for EMs, ICs and all countries combined. Moreover, the frequency with which each type of crisis is observed after the peak of credit booms is also very similar across EMs and ICs (23 v. 25 percent for banking crises, 20 v. 25 percent for currency crises and a common 14 percent for Sudden Stops). Thus, clearly not all credit booms end in crisis, but odds are about 1 out of 4 that once a country enters a credit boom it will end with a currency or a banking crisis, and a little less that it will end in a Sudden Stop.
These findings are broadly consistent with those reported in Schularick and Taylor (2012) . They examined whether credit growth is a significant predictor of banking crises for a sample of fourteen developed countries over the 1870 to 2008 period, and found that indeed credit growth helps predict these crises. However, their analysis provides only indirect evidence of the credit boom-bust cycle because using credit growth per-se as explanatory variable does not identify whether this credit growth is the result of financial deepening or a credit boom.
Our findings are at odds with the conclusion in Gourinchas et al. (2001) , which noted that there is virtually no association between credit booms and financial crises in EMs, They are also sharply different from the findings in Mendoza and Terrones (2008) , where lacking the data from 2007-2010 we found that credit booms in ICs were rarely associated with banking and currency crises, and there was no association with Sudden Stops.
We also constructed seven-year event windows that compare the fluctuations in credit and macro aggregates of countries that experienced a crisis (i.e. banking crisis, currency crisis, or Sudden Stop) with those that did not. The results (available from the authors on request) show clearly that the macro fluctuations in the countries that experienced crisis are larger and display more abrupt declines than those of the non-crisis countries. In particular, the dynamics of credit are more pronounced and with more drastic downswings in the case of the crisis countries than in the non-crisis countries. In addition, the behavior of capital inflows is different across the two groups of countries.
While capital inflows rise in the upswing of the crisis episodes and fall abruptly in the downswing, they seem more stable in the case of the non-crisis episodes. Klenow and Rodriguez (1997) and Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2008) ), using labor and investment data from PWT 7.0 and educational attainment levels from Barro and Lee (2010) . A country is identified to have experienced high TFP growth as of date t if the preceding three-year average of TFP growth ranked on the top quartile of its respective group over the 1975-2010 period. Table 6 shows the fraction of credit booms preceded by large capital inflows, large TFP gains and domestic financial reforms. In the case of ICs, 42 percent of the credit booms followed large TFP gains, 33 percent followed large capital inflows and 22 percent followed significant financial reforms. In contrast, in EMs we find that almost 1/2 of credit booms were preceded by large capital inflows and 30 percent by financial reforms, while TFP gains play a smaller role than in ICs, with a frequency of 20 percent.
These results indicate that surges in capital inflows are a good predictor of credit booms in both ICs and EMs, 12 while in ICs large TFP gains are also a good predictor but financial reforms less so, and the opposite holds for EMs. Table 7 shows the results of a similar frequency analysis but now aimed at examining the association between the peak of credit booms and the exchange rate regimes in place the preceding three years. We use Reinhart and Rogoff's (2004) classification of exchange rate regimes to create the following four regime groupings: fixed and managed, dirty floating, floating and mixed (see the footnote to Table 7 for details). The mixed regime includes countries that switched across the other regimes in any of the three years prior to the peak of the credit boom. The results shown in Table 7 are striking: about 70 percent of the credit booms occur in countries with managed or fixed exchange rate regimes, and this holds for ICs, EMs, and all countries combined. 13
Finally, we use frequency analysis to determine the probability that a country will experience a credit boom once it has crossed the starting threshold. This probability can be a useful "early warning" indicator for surveillance of credit market conditions. We considered starting thresholds of ½ and 1 standard deviations of the cyclical component of our credit measure, and computed the probabilities for ICs, EMs and all countries combined. Once a starting threshold of 1 (½) standard deviation of the cyclical position 12 In terms of the composition of the inflows, net portfolio and debt inflows stand out as the most important for ICs, while net foreign direct investment and net bank flows are the most significant for EMs. 13 In a related paper, Magud, Reinhart and Vesperoni, 2011 , study the effects of exchange rate flexibility on credit expansions during episodes of large capital inflows in the emerging economies. They report evidence suggesting that countries with less flexible exchange rates often experience significant credit expansions during surges in capital inflows; thus, becoming more vulnerable to capital flow reversals.
of credit is crossed, the probability of a credit boom is 13 (8) percent for EMs, 23 (14) percent for ICs, and 17 (10) percent for all countries combined. Naturally, these probabilities are lower with the lower starting threshold, as it is less likely that the cyclical expansion of credit turns into a credit boom. The probabilities are higher for ICs than for EMs, indicating that having crossed the starting threshold is a more precise predictor of credit booms in the former than in the latter.
Conclusions
This paper used a thresholds method to identify and measure credit booms in industrial and emerging economies, and conducted an event study analysis of the dynamics of macro aggregates during credit booms. We identified 70 credit booms in a sample of 61 countries with data for the 1960-2010 period, with half of the credit booms in industrial countries and half in emerging economies. The upswing of these booms is associated with economic expansions, rising equity and housing prices, real currency appreciation, and widening external deficits, followed by the opposite dynamics in the downswing. Moreover, credit booms tend to be synchronized internationally and centered on "big events" like the 1980s debt crisis, Sudden Stops in emerging economies and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis.
Credit booms display three striking similarities across industrial and emerging economies: (1) credit booms normalized by the cyclical variability of credit are similar in magnitude across both groups of countries; (2) banking crises, currency crises or Sudden Stops often follow credit booms, and the frequencies with which they do are similar across industrial and emerging economies; and (3) credit booms often follow surges in capital inflows, TFP gains, and financial reforms, and are far more common with managed than flexible exchange rates. These results differ significantly from previous findings in the literature on credit booms suggesting an ambiguous relationship between credit booms and economic expansions, and little or no association between financial crises and credit booms (see Gourinchas et al. (2001) ). They are also different from the findings of our previous work (Mendoza and Terrones (2008) , which used data until 2006 and reported differences across industrial and emerging economy booms in the above three characteristics that we now find them similar.
The results of our study have important implications for the analysis of macro-finance linkages, and for surveillance of financial systems and their macroeconomic effects.
From the policy perspective, the thresholds method we proposed provides a tractable framework for measuring and identifying credit booms that are closely associated with cyclical fluctuations in macro aggregates and key financial indicators of corporations and banks. Our results show that credit booms can be identified by the size of a credit expansion relative to trend, and that this information can be supplemented with other indicators of excessive credit growth: such as booms in output and expenditures, excessive real appreciation and/or expansion of the nontradables sector, large inflows of foreign capital and fast TFP growth or domestic financial reforms,. Moreover, our results also highlight the importance of using corrective policy actions to prevent credit booms, because the declining phase of credit booms is associated with recessions and a higher incidence of financial crises.
From the perspective of research on macro-finance linkages, our results provide a set of robust empirical regularities that can guide research on models of "credit transmission"
by providing the set of facts that these models should aim to explain. These empirical regularities are reflected in a strong association of credit booms with booms in output and expenditures, rising asset prices, widening external deficits and sharp real appreciations. The output/demand boom has been determined using a similar method to the one employed to determine credit booms, with a boom threshold factor of 1.65. 1/ Fixed and managed includes the following regimes from the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification: no separate legal tender, pre-announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de facto peg, pre-announced crawling peg, pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, de facto crawling peg, and de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%. 2/ Dirty floating includes the following regimes from the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification: pre-announced crawling band
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